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Abstract: By the events in the past years, the integration of data protection mech-
anisms into information systems becomes a central research problem again. In this
technical report for our poster, we show how query rewriting can be used to maintain
privacy of users in smart (or assistive) environments. We developed a privacy respect-
ing query processing and a vertical fragmentation of queries, processing maximal parts
of the query as close to the sources of the data (e.g. sensors) as possible.
1 Introduction to Assistive Systems
Assistive systems are designed to support the user at work (Ambient Assisted Working,
AAW) and at home (Ambient Assisted Living, AAL). Active and passive RFID tags, cam-
eras, microphones, but also sensors on light switches and power sockets capture the current
situation in the ubiquitous environments, up to 100 times per second. These data are stored
by the system and linked to other data, for example social network profiles.
Our main application scenarios are smart environments. These systems are equipped with
a variety of sensors which collect a lot of information. In our Smart Meeting Room at the
Graduate School MuSAMA1 (see Figure 1) we try to support the users to perform a lecture
or a meeting by calculating their intentions and future actions.
To achieve this, we have to find out what happens during the meeting by recognizing the
current actions in the room. For this, the room is equipped with the following sensors and
devices:
• lamps: multiple, dimmable lamps to enlighten the room.
• screens: multiple screens, which can be turned up and down.
• powersocket: multiple electrical outlets, which tracks how much milliamperes are
used.
• pensensor: For each pen at the Smart Board it is tracked, which one has been taken.
1Multimodal Smart Appliance Ensembles for Mobile Applications
ISSN: 0944-5900, Nummer: CS-01-16 1
Privacy Protection through Query Rewriting H. Grunert, A. Heuer
Figure 1: The Smart Appliances Lab at the University of Rostock. Through a variety of sensors,
meetings and lectures are supported by the automatic, intention-driven control of the room.
• thermometer: a thermometer, which checks the temperature in (Unit: ◦C).
• ubisense-tags and -sensor [Cad03]: One tag per user; the sensor supplies a coor-
dinate (x, y, z) in the room’s Cartesian system and a lot of other information (e. g.
whether the position is valid or not).
• sensfloor [SL11]: the center of the room has integrated sensors in the floor, which
checks where someone stands and how much pressure he or she exerts.
• extron and vgasensor: These devices track, which (video) port is connected to a
specific projector.
• eibgateway: A device to control the blinds of the Smart Meeting Room.
Besides of the meeting room scenario, other MuSAMA-related projects apply these tech-
niques to AAL-systems supporting elderly people to be able to live longer in their own
apartment on their own (instead of having to go to a nursing home).
While the assistive capabilities of such smart systems are useful, there is a problem in
this massive amount of processed data that not only enables the intended support such
as fall detection in an apartment for the elderly, but also enables other big data analytics
procedures to calculate a complete personal profile of the person in the apartment.
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2 Introduction to Privacy
In the digital world steadily more and more information about ourselves and our envi-
ronment is collected. Besides “classical” personal information, such as the name, age or
gender, a plurality of sensors records our activities and inclinations. Based on the obtained
information, preferences, patterns of behavior and future events can be calculated. Further-
more, intentions and future actions of the users are derived, so that the smart environment
can react independently to satisfy their needs.
Especially assistive systems using activity and intention recognition [KNY+14] are a pos-
sible cause of privacy violations, especially if the query realizing the recognition query is
performed on a cloud server. The activity and intention recognition is a typical Big Data
Analytics technique [Heu15] that enables other uses of the smart system and its data than
the intended one, resulting in privacy violations.
To reduce privacy violations, it is necessary
• to decrease the amount of collected personal information, i.e. to apply the principle
of data avoidance (except where data are required),
• to process data with personal references as less as possible or — at least — as close
to the local data sources (sensors) as possible and
• to anonymize, pseudonymize and delete personal data, unless it is used for further
processing and necessary to realize the aim of the assistive environment.
Data minimization and data avoidance are therefore prescribed, indispensable require-
ments for the design of smart systems. This requirement can be achieved in databases
by transforming both queries and query results, as well as using views [HL98].
3 Privacy-aware Query Processing
The PArADISE2-approach aims to withdraw the burden of respecting privacy constraints
from the assistive systems by adding privacy protection mechanisms to those systems stor-
ing and analyzing the data: database systems on different levels. The PArADISE approach
combines performance aspects of big data analytics (by using massively parallel database
technology [MH15]) and privacy protection. Our privacy aware query processor (see Fig-
ure 2) generates anonymized result sets. These data maintain a high degree of value for
the initial query generated by the assistive system. On the opposite, additional knowledge
can hardly be derived.
The preprocessor allows the analysis and the rewriting of database queries regarding user-
defined privacy policies [GH15]. During the execution of the request, it is decided whether
the request will be answered and anonymized directly on the current network peer, or
2Privacy Aware Assistive Distributed Information System Environment
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Figure 2: The concept of the privacy-aware query-processor.
is sent to lower nodes (vertical fragmentation, see below). The postprocessor executes
the anonymization of the query results, taking into account various criteria of quality and
privacy. For this, various data protection metrics and algorithms are provided. The module
for the automatic generation of privacy settings produces and adapts existing user-defined
privacy policies to new devices and changing requirements and queries.
3.1 Preprocessing
During the preprocessing stage, the preliminary query is analyzed and checked against
the privacy policy of the affected user. The involved personal information queried by the
system is monitored, whether it is uncovered by the user at all (projection) and if it can
be used under user defined constraints. These constraints can be used to decide if the re-
vealed information will be preselected or aggregated. Furthermore, it is also checked if the
processing node has enough capacity (sufficient CPU-power, free main memory). Also, it
is tested if the information system could gain enough information to produce satisfactory
results. To determine how satisfactory the result is, we are using the information loss met-
ric based on the Kullback Leibler divergence [KL51], which has been shown to be a good
approximation to determine how much information remain [HS10].
Finally, the constraints are used for a modification of the query which fulfills all needs.
For modification, we analyze the different parts of the (SQL:2011-)queries. Attributes in
the SELECT clause are removed, if the user does not want to reveal specific information.
If one sensor releases too much information, another sensor is queried by changing the
relation in the FROM clause. In case that not all tuples shall appear in the result, the
WHERE condition is combined with the user’s integrity constraints and the system query
conjunctively.
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3.2 Postprocessing
Taken the preliminary result from the intermediate stage, the postprocessor checks the
required information of the system and the privacy settings of the user. At this time, the
result is modified with privacy-preserving algorithms like k-anonymity [Sam01] or data
slicing [LLZM12], if and only if the processing unit has enough power. Thus, the modified
result is sent back to the system. In case that a unit does not have enough power, the raw
data will be sent to a more powerful node and anonymized later.
Under due consideration of information loss metrics, like the Kullback-Leibler-Distance
[KL51] or the Direct Distance (DD), the quality difference between the original and the
anonymized data can be calculated. It must apply that the loss of information for the
intended queries should be kept to a minimum while the loss of information for the unin-
tended query should be as high as possible. A simple metric to calculate the information
loss is the Direct Distance which is defined by
DD(R,R′) =
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
distance(i, j),
where n is the number of tuples and m the number of attributes in the original relation R
resp. in the anonymized relation R′, and
distance(i, j) :=
{
0, if value[Ri,j ] = value[R′i,j ]
1 else
calculates the number of unequal attribute values between R and R′.
The ratio of different values in R′ to the total number of values in R (m ∗ n) defines the
quality of the anonymized result of the query. Now, the goal is to find the “Golden Path”
between information loss and a high privacy level.
In the last years, several algorithms based on k-anonymity [Sam01], differential privacy
[Dwo11] and similar concepts have been developed. But there exists no one-size-fits-all
solution which solves all problems. By choosing an appropriate anonymization concept
for the intended analysis, it is possible to purposefully anonymize the data.
The decision, which concept is used in the later implementation, must be closely done
with the developers of analysis functionalities.
By prior analysis and rewriting of the queries it can thereby be determined which attributes
can be used for anonymization, and whether the anonymization should be done column-
(e.g. Slicing [LLZM12]) or tuple-wise (e.g. k-anonymity [Sam01]).
3.3 Privacy policies for smart environments
Our data privacy policy is based on the draft of the W3C for Privacy Preferences Platform
[W3C07], but leaves out browser-specific details, such as the management of cookies. In
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return, our policy provides additional information for configuring data streams, such as the
allowed query interval and possible aggregation levels.
Hitherto, security models and privacy policies aim at protecting whole data records from
unauthorized access. Adding a more fine-granular access control allows the user to spec-
ify which information is revealed and how the data are processed. Data records can be
modified by
• selection,
• projection,
• compression,
• aggregation and
• feature extraction (e.g. on motion images)
to reduce the amount of personal information sent towards the tools for evaluation and
analysis.
Our privacy policy is based on the draft of the W3C for Privacy Preferences Platform
[W3C07], but leaves out browser-specific details, such as the management of cookies. In
return, our policy provides additional information for configuring data streams, such as the
allowed query interval and possible aggregation levels.
4 Query Rewriting by Vertical Fragmentation
The smart environment or assistive system sends a query request Q to the database d
integrating the entire sensor data recorded in our environment. The result ofQ is needed to
perform the activity and intention recognition. The data sources are sensors being located
in appliances in apartments and buildings which sum up to the mentioned (distributed)
database, being d the subset of this information in a specific environment such as one
single apartment.
4.1 Vertical Fragmentation of Queries
Instead of shipping d to the cloud server sending the request, maximal parts of Q will
be evaluated as close to the sensor as possible. As can be seen in Figure 3, instead of
performing Q(d) in the cloud, the maximal subquery Qj will be shipped to the next lower
node of the processing chain, in the case of the example a PC located in our apartment.
WhileQ performs an iterative machine learning algorithm implemented in R and SQL, and
Qj being a complex SQL query with recursion, the lowest node in the processing chain (the
sensors) can only compute some filter mechanisms (simple selections) and some simple
aggregations over the last values generated (window function: average of last minute).
ISSN: 0944-5900, Nummer: CS-01-16 6
Privacy Protection through Query Rewriting H. Grunert, A. Heuer
Figure 3: Vertical Query Fragmentation: Query and query result transformation on different peers.
Each of the nodes will ship the query result dj to the node sending the request. After a
final anonymization step A, the data “leaving our apartment” d′ will only be a small subset
of the original data d.
We assume that the lower nodes will each have less query computing power than the higher
nodes: while sensors are only performing simple filters / selections and aggregations, an
appliance like a TV or a smart network music player will be able to perform simple (SQL-
superlight) database queries, an Android-based home media server even more complex
SQL queries. This situation is shown in Table 1: besides having more computer power
on higher levels of our vertical architecture, and more capabilities for expressing machine
learning algorithms, we will have more computers / processors per person on the lower
nodes of the architecture. Normally, one assistive system in an apartment of a person will
have hundreds of sensors combined in ten to fifty appliances (like Home Media Centers,
TVs, network music players and even carpets with fall detection).
The whole query processing procedure
Q(d) := dj = Qj(. . . d
′
i = A(di = Qi(. . . (d1 = Q1(d)) . . . )
is transformed in a way, that the cloud server will perform a remainder query Qδ on d′
instead of performing Q on d, hence resulting in the privacy protecting query rewriting
Q(d) −→ Qδ(d′). In other words, the query Q is fragmented in queries Qj (that can be
performed at a lower node) and a remainder query Qδ that can only be performed at the
more powerful node of our vertical fragmentation of query processors.
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Level System Capability Number of nodes
E1 cloud complex ML algorithm in R, n for m person,
SQL:2003 with UDF n m
E2 PC in apartment SQL-92 1 for 1 person
E3 appliance in apartment SQL “light” with joins 10 - 50 for 1 person
E4 sensor in appliance
(TV), in environment
(carpet)
filter / window, simple selec-
tion, aggregates on streams
(over the last seconds)
 100 for 1 person
Table 1: Overview on different systems relating to their capability to execute SQL queries.
Since recognizing the maximal possible SQL queries in an R machine learning algorithm
is undecidable in general, we try to detect some larger “SQLable” patterns [Weu16] in the
activity and intention recognition procedures described in [KNY+14]. Other aspects of
our privacy-aware query-processor are described in, e.g. [Gru14a].
By rewriting the query Q into Qj and Qδ and only performing Qδ outside our “privacy
protected” appliance ensemble in our apartment, we hope to automatically prevent the
service provider of our assistive system to use our personal data in a way we did not
consider to be possible when starting to use his smart service. A remaining open problem
is to decide whether a privacy-violating query Q↓ can be performed even on d′ instead of
d. In this case, we have to extend the anonymization step A already performed. This open
problem results in a query containment problem3 of Q,Q↓ and Qj that will be part of our
further research.
4.2 Use Case Scenario
While smart environments and assistive systems are calculating the result of analysis on
a central hub, the required data is normally distributed on multiple databases. To perform
the analysis, a database query Q is send to the database d which integrates the whole raw
data collected by the sensors of the environment. The result of the query Q is needed to
perform particular activity and intention recognition algorithms. In the following example,
we assume that multiple sensors are placed in our apartement.
Let us imagine that we ordered an extensive assistance service provided by the company
Poodle for our apartement. Poodle, once a pure provider of a search engine, today is also
a provider of smart home technologies like intelligent, sensor based heating thermostats,
Smart TVs, kitchenware, carpets and furniture. From Poodle we expect certain services,
such as an automated problem identification like fall detection. To offer these services,
Poodle’s cloud server has to send queries (like Q mentioned above) to the sensor data in
our apartment.
Because Poodle offers their assistive environment with low cost, the company wants to
sell the derived personal profiles to third parties. In contrast to Poodle, we don’t want that
3For more information regarding Query Containment Problem, see [Chi09] or chapter 8 in [KSS14]
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to be done. Therefore, we are glad that Poodle offers this service also with a PArADISE
based option, which is a little more expensive but is privacy-aware.
Instead of transfering all data from d to the cloud server of Poodle that executes the query,
maximal parts of Q are extracted and performed as close as possible at the sensor level.
In Figure 3, we can see that Q(d) will not be executed in the cloud, but the maximal
subqueries Qj will be transmitted to the next node in the process chain. In our example, a
computer placed in our apartment is assumed at this position.
Our example is based on the following R-code for the analysis of sensor data (excerpt of a
Kalman filter):
1 filterByClass(sqldf(
2 SELECT regr_intercept(y, x)
3 OVER (PARTITION BY z ORDER BY t)
4 FROM(SELECT x, y, z, t
5 FROM d’)
6 ), action=’’walk’’, do.plot=F)
The function filterByClass filters the data of a DataFrame (R data type) to detect if the ex-
ecuted activity was equal to “walk”. There will be no graphical output of the result of the
analysis (do.plot=F). Taking the result of the nested SQL query, the function sqldf trans-
forms it to a R-readable format. The SQL query realizes a complex regression analysis
with partitioning, aggregates and ORDER BY clauses. The data originate from a source d′
which is part of a peer-to-peer network (see Figure 3).
Our network consists of cloud server, local server, as well as embedded computer and
small sensors with different performance characteristics regarding computational power,
available memory and compliance to different SQL standards. In our example, the raw data
is extracted from a small motion recognition sensor from the lowest level. The original
query Q is transmitted over several nodes towards the sensor. In the process, all data from
the sensor are queried (SELECT * FROM di respectively SELECT * FROM stream).
In addition to the query, there exists a privacy [Gru14b, Mei15] for the assistive system
w.r.t. the activity recognition filter (see Figure 4; simplified description). In this policy,
two privacy claims are given: The x-value of the sensor has to be greater than the y-value
at any time (x&gt;y). Considering the z-value, it has to be always less than 2 (z&lt;2) and
can only appear in an average-aggregation, grouped by the corresponding x- and y-values,
having the sum of z less than 100.
For the transformation process, the query is rewritten with respect to the given privacy
policy. Thereby, the additional conditions will be inserted as WHERE and HAVING clauses
in the innermost possible part of the nested SQL query. Regarding aggregated values, new
attribute names are inserted and, if necessary, delegated to the out queries.
1 filterByClass(sqldf(
2 SELECT regr_intercept(y, x)
3 OVER (PARTITION BY zAVG ORDER BY t)
4 FROM(SELECT x, y, AVG(z) AS zAVG, t
5 FROM d’
6 WHERE x>y
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1 <module module_ID="ActionFilter">
2 <attributeList>
3 <attribute name="x">
4 <allow>true</allow>
5 <condition>
6 <atomicCondition>
7 x&gt;y
8 </atomicCondition>
9 </condition>
10 </attribute>
11 <attribute name="y">
12 <allow>true</allow>
13 </attribute>
14 <attribute name="z">
15 <allow>true</allow>
16 <condition>
17 <atomicCondition>
18 z&lt;2
19 </atomicCondition>
20 </condition>
21 <aggregation>
22 <aggregationType>
23 AVG
24 </aggregationType>
25 <groupBy>x, y</groupBy>
26 <having>SUM(z)&gt;100</having>
27 </aggregation>
28 </attribute>
29 <attribute name="t">
30 <allow>true</allow>
31 </attribute>
32 </attributeList>
33 </module>
Figure 4: Privacy policy for the ongoing example.
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7 AND z<2
8 GROUP BY x, y
9 HAVING SUM(z) > 100)
10 ), action=’’walk’’, do.plot=F)
Afterwards, the transformed query will be distributed to the particular computation nodes.
While the R-code will still be executed on the cloud server, the local server has enough
power to perform the regression analysis part of the SQL query on its own.
1 filterByClass(d’,
2 action=’’walk’’, do.plot=F)
The result of the regression analysis d′ will be provided as an R-DataFrame on the cloud
server. On the local server, it is possible to separate the inner SQL query in order to
outsource it to the home media center. The inner query performs the regression analysis
over the defined partition.
1 SELECT regr_intercept(y, x)
2 OVER (PARTITION BY zAVG ORDER BY t)
3 FROM d3
The media center itself takes only the aggregation part of the SQL query. In our example,
the analysis categorizes movement activities based on the height (z). Based on the privacy
policy, the z-coordinate is restricted to its average value grouped by x and y. To ensure that
enough values are considered for this aggregation, the sum of z has to be more than 100
per grouping set.
1 SELECT x, y, AVG(z) AS zAVG, t
2 FROM d2
3 GROUP BY x, y
4 HAVING SUM(z) > 100
The WHERE-clause is shifted to an appliance. Basic comparison operations, like less-
than or equals between two attributes, are executed on the appliance. The rest of the
WHERE-condition is pushed down towards the sensor. Unnecessary attributes are also
filtered out. For the regression analysis, only the x-, y- and z-coordinate and the timestamp
are remaining.
1 SELECT x, y, z, t
2 FROM d1
3 WHERE x>y
At the sensor, it is not possible to select single attributes, so all attributes are queried at
once. While the appliance was able to compare two attributes against each other, the sensor
can only compare an attribute against a constant.
1 SELECT *
2 FROM stream
3 WHERE z<2
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After retrieving the data from the sensor the result set, will be sent through the processing
chain back to the cloud server. Meanwhile, the data will be anonymized and processed
step by step.
5 Summary and Outlook
In this paper we presented a vertical architecture to fragment queries against sensor data
in a smart environment such that large portions of this query can be pushed down as close
to the source of the data as possible. By this vertical fragmentation of queries into pushed-
down and remainder queries we hope to support privacy constraints of the users of these
smart environments such as assistive systems.
As a second (post-processing) technique, we are additionally able to anonymize the re-
sult sets of the data by detecting quasi-identifiers and using coumn-wise or tuple-wise
anonymization.
We applied our concept in a smart home scenario as a use case and demostrated how a
machine learning algorithm written in R can be transformed and pushed down in several
steps resulting in some simple filter operations at the sensor level.
The data used for this purpose consists of sensor data that has been recorded in the Smart
Appliance Lab of the graduate school MuSAMA [BK12].
A remaining open problem is to decide whether a privacy-violating query can be performed
even on reduced data set. In this case, we have to extend the anonymization step already
performed. This open problem results in a query containment problem that will be part of
our further research.
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